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Laws: An Invariance- Based Account  
  
1. Introduction 
 
This paper defends an account that links laws of nature to invariance  (a.k.a 
stability, robustness). Laws are generalizations1 about repeatable relationships2 that are   
invariant over variations in initial and other sorts of conditions, at least within an 
appropriate range of such variations  —invariant in the sense that laws will or would 
continue to hold under such variations. Alternatively, laws are generalizations that exhibit 
a certain sort of independence from initial conditions, where initial conditions themselves 
are understood as meeting, at least ideally, certain sorts of (additional) independence 
requirements.   
I have defended an invariance-based account of laws elsewhere  (Woodward, 
2003, 2013) and broadly similar accounts have been proposed by other writers, including 
Mitchell, 2000 and Lange, 2009, although their treatments differ in detail from mine.  As 
nearly as I can tell, such accounts have been less influential than several alternatives, 
including Best Systems Analyses (Lewis, 1986) and accounts that either attempt to 
“ground” laws in metaphysically special entities3 (e.g., relations between universals,  
dispositions possessed essentially ) or to replace laws with claims about such entities 
(Mumford, 2004).  I thus begin with some general remarks about why invariance- based 
accounts of laws deserve more attention.    
1.1) They fit scientific practice well (or at least better than alternatives).  Explicit 
discussion of laws, at least in physics, commonly links these to symmetry and invariance 
principles, as illustrated by the remarks of Eugene Wigner discussed in more detail in 
section 2.  It is natural to think of symmetry principles as special cases of a more general 
invariance-based conception of laws—see below. By contrast, in my view and as argued 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1   The word “law” is used in both philosophy and science to refer both to  (i) 
generalizations, formulated mathematically or in some other representational format, as 
when one says that Maxwell’s equations are laws of nature, and (ii) to whatever it is in 
nature that “corresponds” to these generalizations. For the most part, I adopt the former 
usage on the grounds that it is less likely to beg important questions about what the 
“objective correlates” of laws in sense (i) above are.   
2 Laws are often taken (not just by philosophers but by scientists—see the quotations 
from Wigner below) to describe “regularities”. My talk of repeatable relationships is 
meant to avoid some of the problematic features of this view but little will turn on this in 
what follows. 
3 Sometimes called “non-Humean” entities or properties or “whatnots” (Lewis, 1986). 
Although I will sometimes use similar terminology, it is not entirely perspicuous.  In my 
view, there is nothing problematic about such ordinary language claims as “salt has a 
disposition to dissolve in water”— problems only arise when this disposition is invested 
with various other features and accorded the explanatory role of “grounding” laws. 
Insofar as there is an objection to  “non-Humean stuff”,  it ought to be directed at this 
latter use of disposition-talk.  
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by others  (e.g., Lange, 2004), the idea that laws must satisfy symmetry/ invariance 
conditions does not emerge very naturally, if at all, from alternative accounts of laws—
instead it has to be imposed, to the extent that it can, by hand.    
1.2) Laws are often described by having a kind of necessity or inviolability. 
Neither we nor the rest of nature can “break” or avoid them, at least in regimes in which 
they hold.  However, this notion of necessity, if intelligible at all, stands in need of 
explication, and alternatives to invariance- based accounts have not been very successful 
at this.  Some (e.g. Bird, 2007) claim that the necessity of laws is a kind of metaphysical  
necessity, but, in addition to its obscurity, current statements of this idea do  not fit well 
with how scientists reason about laws. Scientists seem quite willing to consider   
scenarios in which such alleged metaphysical necessities are violated—e.g., what the 
trajectories of the planets would be if gravity conformed to an inverse cube law4.  
“Metaphysical necessity” seems too strong a notion and too far removed from what might 
be established by empirical investigation to capture the kind of necessity possessed by 
laws. 
  Best Systems analyses have the opposite problem: they take laws to be 
regularities described by axioms or theorems in a deductive systemization involving a 
best balance of simplicity and strength imposed on a Humean Basis specified in terms of 
spatio-temporal relations and perfectly natural monadic properties, characterized non-
modally.  Although defenders can stipulate that what it is for a generalization to be 
“physically necessary” is just for it to be such an axiom or theorem, it is not obvious what 
this status has to do with notions of inviolability or necessity or, more generally, why one 
should expect the axioms and theorems of the BSA to be invariant in the sense described 
above. On the contrary, the BSA threatens to make laws too sensitive to (non-invariant 
with respect to) initial condition information5.  
 By contrast, invariance-based accounts provide a naturalistic, scientifically 
respectable and non-mysterious treatment of what non-violability and physical necessity 
amount to: this just amounts to the claim that within the domain of invariance of a law 
there are no initial and background conditions that might be realized—nothing that might 
be done by nature or an experimenter—under which the law will fail to hold6.  
Inviolability, non-breakability and so on are thus just other names for invariance.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 This point is emphasized by Lange, 2009.  
5  See  Woodward 2003 and below for additional discussion. On the invariance-based 
account, laws are those generalizations that continue to hold under a range of different 
initial conditions. But sufficiently different initial conditions will generate significantly 
different Humean Bases, which may require different axioms for their systemization. 
Thus which generalizations are BSA-laws will depend on the actual distribution of initial 
conditions. This reflects the fact the BSA does not cleanly separate lawful and initial 
condition information in the way the invariance-based account does.  
6 As explained in more detail below, this is not just the triviality that laws hold when they 
hold; it rather involves the claim that laws would continue to hold if non-actual 
conditions (and non-actual processes leading to these conditions) within their domain of 
invariance were to be realized, where this domain can be given an independent 
specification—in physics this is often done by specifying length or energy scales in 
which the law holds.  
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Moreover, the invariance of a generalization is something for which we can get empirical 
evidence  (Woodward, 2013 and Section 4 below).   
1.3) Invariance-based accounts combine some of the most plausible elements in 
both BSA-type accounts, and more “metaphysical” accounts, while rejecting less 
attractive elements of both accounts. Invariance-based accounts agree with the BSA and 
disagree with the metaphysical accounts in holding that the postulation of special 
metaphysical entities is unhelpful. However, like metaphysical accounts, and unlike the 
BSA, invariance –based accounts do not aspire to provide a reduction of the modal 
features of laws to non-modal features.  
Although the invariance-based account can be thought of, in the respects 
described above, as situated midway between the BSA and metaphysical accounts, it 
departs from both in a fundamental resect. Both the latter aspire to provide “truth-
makers” or “metaphysical foundations” for laws, with this presumably consisting of 
something like the full Humean Basis in the case of the BSA, and the metaphysically 
special entities and relations in the case of non-Humean theories. As commentators have 
noted (and, often, complained7) the invariance-based account provides no such 
metaphysical story about truth-makers or foundations, either in the form of special 
entities or a reduction. For many philosophers, the absence of such a story in an account 
of laws is rather like Hamlet without the prince-- the most important element has been 
left out.  Bird, for example, writes that although the invariance-based account makes an 
“important contribution to understanding the superstructure [of how we reason about 
laws] it does not tell us (nor is it intended to tell us) about the metaphysical 
underpinnings” (2007, p. 5). He also suggests that any one of the alternative accounts 
mentioned above might provide such underpinnings for talk of invariant relationships.   
   In response, I would emphasize that, first, there is a great deal of value in 
providing a descriptively accurate characterization of the “superstructure" of our thinking 
about laws and the role they play in scientific theorizing—this superstructure is far more 
complex and subtle than many philosophers suppose.  Second, contrary to what Bird 
suggests,  it is not true that all of various accounts of the metaphysical underpinnings of 
laws on offer can be made to fit with the invariance-based account. Instead, the 
invariance-based account captures features of scientific practice not readily captured by 
any of these alternative accounts.   
  A third and more fundamental consideration is whether, as Bird implies, the 
invariance-based account not only leaves something out  (a story about metaphysical 
foundations)  but also leaves something out that can and  needs to be provided.  
Disciplines other than philosophy (including in particular the mathematics and the natural 
sciences) recognize the possibility of ill-posed problems—problems which as currently 
formulated rest on mistaken presuppositions or which   assume constraints on what 
counts as a solution that are unsatisfiable or ill-motivated.  Sometimes solving a problem 
requires rejecting one or more of these presuppositions/ constraints and/or reconfiguring 
the problem itself or rethinking what is required to solve it.   
I’m inclined to think that the problem of identifying truth makers  for laws in the 
sense of “truth-maker” that most philosophers have in mind is just such an ill-posed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See, e.g.,  Bird,  2007, Psillos, 2004. 
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problem. A detailed argument for this claim is beyond the scope of this paper but I try to 
briefly suggest (Section 9) why I think it is true.    
 
2. Wigner on Invariance and Independence. 
 
With this as motivation, I turn to some remarks about laws, invariance and initial 
conditions taken from several of the essays in Eugene Wigner (1979).  I quote 
extensively because I want to make detailed use of Wigner’s ideas in elucidating  the 
connection between lawfulness and invariance.   
  Wigner’s point of departure is the contrast between laws and initial conditions 
He writes:  
 
The world is very complicated and it is clearly impossible for the human mind to 
understand it completely. Man has therefore devised an artifice which permits the 
complicated nature of the world to be blamed on something which is called 
accidental and thus permits him to abstract a domain in which simple laws can be 
found. The complications are called initial conditions; the domain of regularities, 
laws of nature. Un-natural as such a division of the world’s structure may appear 
from a very detached point of view, and probable though it is that the possibility 
of such a division has its own limits, the underlying abstraction is probably one of 
the most fruitful ones the human mind has made. It has made the natural sciences 
possible.  
 
He also stresses the role of invariance principles in the identification of laws: 
 
However, the possibility of isolating the relevant initial conditions would not in 
itself make possible the discovery of laws of nature. It is, rather, also essential that 
given the same essential initial conditions, the result will be the same no matter 
where and when we realize these. This principle can formulated, in the language 
of initial conditions, as the statement that the absolute position and the absolute 
time are never essential initial conditions is the first and perhaps the most 
important theorem of invariance in physics. If it were not for it, it might have 
been impossible for us to discover laws of nature…. 
   
Commenting further on the contrast between laws and initial conditions, Wigner 
introduces several additional ideas:   
 
The fact that initial conditions and laws of nature completely determine the 
behavior is … true in any causal theory. The surprising discovery of Newton’s 
age is just the clear separation of laws of nature on the one hand and initial 
conditions on the other. The former are precise beyond anything reasonable; we 
know virtually nothing about the latter (my italics).   
 
Wigner also suggests that if there were regularities or relations or constraints among 
initial conditions, this would suggest that our specification of the laws of nature was 
inadequate:  
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how can we ascertain that we know all the laws of nature relevant to a set of 
phenomena? If we do not, we would determine unnecessarily many initial 
conditions in order to specify the behavior of the object. One way to ascertain this 
would be to prove that all the initial conditions can be chosen arbitrarily.  ( 40) 
 
The minimal set of initial conditions not only does not permit any exact relation 
between its elements: on the contrary, there is reason to contend that these are, or 
at some time have been, as random as the externally imposed, gross constraints 
allow.  
  
He explains what he has in mind by reference to Kepler’s laws and Bode’s law. These  
involve regularities in what we think of as initial conditions.  Wigner comments: 
 
However, the existence of the regularities in the initial conditions is considered so 
unsatisfactory that it is felt necessary to show that the regularities are but a 
consequence of a situation in which there were no regularities. 
 
As an illustration, he cites a hypothesis advanced  by von Weizsacker according to which 
the “solar system consisted of a central star, with a gas in rotation but otherwise in 
random motion around it”. Von Weizsacker attempts to deduce regularities like Bode’s 
law from this hypothesis; thus, in Wigner’s words,  
 
Attempt[ing] to show that the apparently organized nature of these initial 
conditions was preceded by a state in which the uncontrolled initial conditions 
were random.  
He adds 
These are, on the whole, exceptional situations. In most cases, there is no reason 
to question the random nature of the noncontrolled, or nonspecified, initial 
conditions  (41) 
 
      From these remarks, we may extract the following picture.  In many although 
perhaps not all cases, science proceeds by (somehow) making a “cut” or “separation” 
between initial conditions and laws.  Wigner does not describe procedures for doing this 
(nor will I) but he does tell us something about the features that each component  (initial 
conditions versus laws) will possess once we have made the separation—thus describing 
in part what success in making the separation will consist in.  First, the laws are 
associated with “regularities” that possess invariance properties. Part of what this means 
is that the laws possess certain symmetries in the sense of returning exactly the same 
solutions or predictions under certain kinds of transformations in the initial conditions—
for example, the laws may tell us that otherwise similar systems which are spatially 
translated with respect each other will behave in the same way and similarly for other 
sorts of transformations.  According to Wigner, some minimal degree of invariance of 
this sort is probably necessary for doing science at all.    
 Laws also possess additional invariance properties which we can think of as 
generalizing these symmetry-linked invariance conditions:  the laws themselves (and the 
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relationships described by the laws) should be stable or continue to hold as the initial 
conditions vary, at least for some range of such variations, even though the laws will 
yield different predictions as we combine them with different initial conditions.  While 
the invariance/symmetry of, say, Newton’s gravitational inverse square law under spatial 
translations implies that two masses separated by a fixed distance will exert the same 
force on each other if this system undergoes a spatial translation, this more general notion 
of invariance requires that the law itself --  F= Gm1m2/r2  and the relationship it describes 
-- should continue to hold as the magnitudes of the masses and the distance between them 
varies, at least for some “appropriate” range of such variation.   (See below for what this  
means). In other words, we should make the cut between laws and initial conditions in 
such a way that the laws are such that when conjoined with a range of  different initial  
conditions,  they continue to  correctly describe the behavior of the systems to which they 
apply.  Moreover, we should formulate individual laws in such a way that they are 
invariant not just over  initial conditions in the sense of values taken by variables 
explicitly figuring in those laws (m and r in the case of the inverse square law)  but under 
changes  in other variables as well --- e.g., changes in the colors or shapes of the masses 
in particular gravitating systems or other sorts of “background” changes. In what follows 
I will use the notion of invariance under changes in “initial conditions” to include such 
additional changes as well.   
 To pick up on other aspects of Wigner’s remarks and to make a connection with 
what will come later, one way of thinking about these invariance conditions is that they 
require a kind of independence of laws from initial conditions—the cut between laws and 
initial conditions should be made in such a way that they are “independent” of each other 
or as “separate” as possible.  Of course, in this sort of context, “independence” does not 
mean statistical or probabilistic independence8, at least in any literal sense: laws do not 
correspond to random variables characterized by joint probability distributions also 
involving initial conditions. Nor does it seem right to think of the independence in 
question as a kind of causal independence of any straightforward sort.  
One possibility suggested both by Wigner’s discussion and some other ideas 
derived from machine learning described briefly below (Section 6) is to think of the 
independence in question as a kind of informational independence: we want the split 
between laws and initial conditions to be chosen in such a way that these are as 
informationally independent as possible, in the sense that specific information about 
which initial conditions obtain for a system should not provide information (or at least 
specific, non-generic information) about the laws that describe that system and 
conversely. In Wigner’s language there should be “no relation” (at least of a sort we are 
able to describe) between whatever is specifically true of the initial conditions and 
whatever is true of the laws and conversely. Of course this requirement needs to be 
understood in such a way that it is consistent with the same variables characterizing both 
the laws and initial conditions—otherwise we would not be able to apply the laws to the 
initial conditions. So in this respect there will be some connection between the laws and 
initial conditions.  Rather the idea is that specific values taken by the initial conditions or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Or at least there is no obvious warrant for such an interpretation. A Bayesian treatment 
in which it is assumed that there is a joint probability distribution over laws and initial 
conditions may be possible but I ignore this in what follows.  
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specific parameterizations of those conditions or specific relationships characterizing  
patterns in those conditions should not occur in the laws, if this can be avoided. (Again, 
see Section 6.)  Speaking metaphorically, given the laws, we or nature should be able to 
independently and freely choose whatever initial conditions we wish to combine them 
with9.     
So far we have been talking about the “independence” of laws from initial 
conditions.  Recall, however, that Wigner also   describes what are in effect independence 
conditions applying to the initial conditions themselves—roughly, these “should be as 
random as the externally imposed gross constraints will allow”  with  the existence of 
regularities in initial conditions being considered “unsatisfactory” (1979, p. 41).  
 Wigner does not further explain what he means by “random” or by “the existence 
of a regularity in the initial conditions” but here statistical or quasi-statistical 
interpretations seem more appropriate:  absent specific information to the contrary, there 
is a default in favor of assuming that initial conditions characterizing different systems  or 
characterizing appropriately distinct elements of the same system (where these are taken 
at the “same time” -- that is, on a surface of simultaneity—see below) should be 
statistically  independent  of one another.  Or, more weakly, one might take the idea to be 
that such initial conditions should at least be capable of varying independently of each 
other—there should be no lawful constraints among the initial conditions themselves. 
Moreover, one might expect that under the right circumstances this possibility of free 
variation should  manifest itself in statistical independence  or something close to it, as 
well as in the ability of experimenters to set up experiments at separated locations 
realizing “arbitrarily” different initial conditions10. If, contrary to this default, a regularity  
or non-independence is present among the initial conditions,  one would expect that there 
is some further explanation of this, which traces the dependency or regularity back to 
earlier conditions satisfying the randomness requirement, as illustrated by the hypothesis 
about the formation of the solar system.  
  This suggestion about initial conditions is allied to assumptions that are 
sometimes described under such rubrics as the independence of incoming influences or 
the principle of the common cause, where the latter says that if X does not cause Y and Y 
does not cause X and they have no common cause Z,  one should assume that X and Y 
are statistically independent. This provides a connection between this portion of Wigner’s 
remarks and a commonly accepted, if sometimes controversial, methodological maxim.  
Finally, to avoid misunderstanding, let me emphasize, that whether some 
proposed set of laws (and accompanying sets of claims about initial conditions) actually 
have the features of invariance and independence described above is always an empirical 
matter. It is nature and not any kind of a priori or purely formal analysis that settles 
whether or not  some proposed law is or is not invariant under some specified set of 
changes in initial conditions.       	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 In certain speculative multiverse cosmological models, this picture of different  sets of 
laws and  different sets of initial conditions being generated independently of one another 
in different “worlds”  may be understood non-metaphorically.  
10 The  notion of “free assignability” of initial conditions is sometimes used to express 
both this idea about the absence of relations among initial conditions and their 
independence from the laws.  
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3.  Wigner Explicated Further   
 
Let me next underscore some additional features of  these “Wignerian” ideas. 
Note first that both initial conditions and laws are characterized via a set of interrelated 
constraints that must be satisfied together:  we choose what to count   as a   law and what 
to regard as  initial conditions in such a way that these constraints are simultaneously 
satisfied.  In particular, the invariance possessed by laws is not understood as  a matter of 
the law continuing  to hold under just any arbitrary counterfactual stipulation but  rather 
as invariance under a much more specific set of changes – changes in initial conditions, 
where these meet further requirements having to do with independent realizability. Note 
that the “independence” and the “realizability” component of this requirement themselves 
have a modal character11.  
This is one of several respects in which, in the  account described above,    
invariance is understood in a non-reductive way—the (modally committed) notion of a 
change in an independently realizable  initial condition enters into the characterization of 
invariance. This   picture contrasts with one in which one somehow begins with   access 
to information that is completely non-modal in character, and that can be characterized 
independently of “laws”, identifies regularities from this  information, and then promotes 
some of these to the status of laws on the basis of additional criteria such as those 
specified by the BSA.  
 Another feature of this invariance-based picture is that the initial conditions are 
regarded as subject to very different constraints than the laws—roughly, one tries to put 
as much structure or regularity as possible into the laws (in this sense one looks for 
“simple” laws), while choosing what counts as initial conditions in such a way that these 
are unstructured as possible ( If one thinks of this also as simplicity constraint, it has 
different consequences than the simplicity constraint imposed on laws).  One can think of 
this as a matter of choosing so as simultaneously satisfy different desiderata (order for 
laws, disorder for initial conditions) but this choice appears to have a different structure 
than the “trade-off” described in the BSA.    
  Also worth noting is Wigner’s pragmatic attitude toward the  “split” between 
laws and initial conditions.  Although he describes it as “one of the most fruitful divisions 
that the human mind has made”, he also says it is an “artifice” and perhaps “un-natural” 
from a  “very detached perspective”, adding “that the possibility of such a division has its 
own limits”.  In a footnote  (p. 3) he suggests that “the artificial nature of the division of 
information into “initial conditions” and “laws of nature” is perhaps most evident in the 
realm of cosmology”, adding that, “It is in fact impossible to adduce reasons against the 
assumption that the laws of nature would be different even in small domains if the 
universe had a radically different structure”.     	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 “Realizability” is a subtle notion that deserves more explication than I can give it here. 
At least in many cases, it means that the occurrence of the initial condition  taken in itself 
is physically possible. However, in a number of cases, no such requirement  of physical 
possibility is imposed on whatever process is modeled as leading to the initial condition 
in question—e.g., one may model the initial condition as imposed by a Dirac-delta 
function-like impulse.   
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In remarking that there may be physical situations or contexts in which the 
law/initial condition distinction breaks down or fails to apply, I take Wigner to be 
suggesting that our ability to make this distinction requires that nature behaves in a way 
that “supports” the distinction.    The distinction thus   tracks “objective” features in 
nature, but these features are not guaranteed to be   present in all situations.  
 At the same time, however, Wigner also emphasizes that there is an element of 
“artifice” in the construction of theories embodying this distinction, with such theories 
being adopted because they are “fruitful” and not just because nature allows us to 
construct them.  At the risk of putting words in Wigner’s mouth, this suggests that there 
is a “functional” story12 to be told about role of law/initial condition distinction in our 
thinking– functional in the sense that this structure or architecture is adopted because it    
is more fruitful to contributing to certain goals than alternative systems of  representation 
that do not involve a separation of laws and initial conditions. (For more on what these 
goals might be, see Section 5 below.)  
If one were to focus entirely on this second feature, having to do with the goal of 
finding theories with a certain structure, to the exclusion of the first, having to do with the  
features of nature that permit the construction of theories with this structure, one might be 
led to a view according to which the law/initial condition contrast is  merely something 
that we “make up” and “project” onto nature.  The fact that nature has to behave in 
certain ways for the attempt to describe it in accord with the law/initial condition contrast 
to be successful suggests instead that more is going on than mere projection—it points us 
in the direction of  (or suggests that there must be something correct about) a more 
“realistic” picture of the status of laws. But I suggest that what is supported is (at best) a 
kind of tempered and restricted realism: we should think of the law/initial condition 
distinction as a distinction that works well for us, at least often and around here, and we 
should not neglect the fact that the distinction is employed because there are things we 
want to do with it—e.g., predict and explain.  Like “cause”13,  “law” thus has a dual or 
janus-faced character; it functions to organize our thinking in a certain way (it has a 
“design” component) and, when applicable, tracks features of the world. To understand 
the notion of law one needs to keep both of these aspects in mind.   
To bring out the significance of this last point, observe that is certainly possible to 
describe nature in ways that do not employ a  distinction  between independent laws and 
initial conditions.   Following Wigner, I will take it that the (or a) major reason for not 
doing this is that the resulting descriptions are less fruitful or effective than those 
incorporating the law/initial condition split.  Although I lack space to argue for this claim 
in detail, I take this (the possibility and fruitfulness of the distinction) to be a discovery 
that occurs, perhaps gradually, in the early modern period, with a key element   involving 
rejection of pictures of nature in which, from a modern perspective, law and initial 
condition information are intermingled or conflated rather than distinguished and 
regarded as independent.  Thinking, as scholastics and Aristotelians were wont to do, of 
nature in terms of active powers and tendencies inherent in bodies that lead them to 
behave as they do and focusing on what happens most frequently or “for the most part” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12  For more on what is meant by a “functional” story in the context of understanding 
causation, see Woodward (2014).  
13 See Woodward, 2014.  
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involves just such an intermingling, which needed to be rejected for modern science to 
take the form that it did.14   
 A key element in this change was the recognition that the world of common 
sense and ordinary observation is disorderly in many respects and that this disorder can 
be regarded as the upshot of often hidden orderly constraints (the laws), interacting with 
disorderly initial conditions, with the former capable of being formulated independently 
of the latter, so that the disorder can, as it were, be segregated off into the initial 
conditions. Thinking of laws as in some way “external” to (or independent of) the 
particular objects they describe, however puzzling this may seem metaphysically, seems 
to have been a key part of this change in thinking.   
Let me conclude this section by acknowledging what will be obvious to 
cognoscenti: the picture I have presented, when construed as a general account of laws in 
science (or even in physics) is (to put it charitably) hugely oversimplified. To begin with,  
although Wigner does not explicitly say this, his  formulation seems to require (or at least 
to apply most naturally) to systems in which there is a well-posed “initial value” problem:   
a so-called Cauchy surface which  allows for a complete specification at a time-slice of 
the initial conditions governing the system. (It is these conditions that are supposed to be 
capable of freely varying or independent of one another. Obviously initial conditions at 
different time slices will not be independent.) Wigner thinks of the fundamental laws  (as 
many philosophers of science do) as dynamical laws expressed by hyperbolic differential 
equations specifying the evolution of these systems over time.  
    At present by no means all candidate laws take this form.  Some candidate laws 
are not of evolutionary type and are not expressed by means of hyperbolic differential 
equations. Relatedly, in focusing, as Wigner does, on invariance under initial conditions, 
I have completely ignored the role played by boundary conditions, needed for the 
characterization of many systems and for the solution of the differential equations (the 
laws) applied to those systems.  As emphasized by Wilson (1990), the equations 
governing the interior of a system may accept only certain boundary conditions and not 
others; Indeed, certain boundary conditions (and the physics they implicitly assume) may 
be inconsistent with the  equations governing the interior. The boundary conditions 
themselves may embody additional modal information (e.g. information about what can 
be changed independently along the boundary and what cannot), so that again we have a 
situation in which not all such information is carried by the laws alone.   
 Obviously the simple characterization of invariance related notions attributed 
above to Wigner requires elaboration and qualification if it is to be extended to these 
more complicated situations.  I will not try to do this here.  One has to begin somewhere.  
 
 4. More on Invariance 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 What happens most frequently reflects a kind of mixture of which initial conditions are 
realized in nature most often and the laws applying to these conditions. Thinking in terms 
of powers which are characterized in terms of their effects also seems to lead in many 
cases to a mixing or lawful and initial condition information, since the effects depend on 
which initial conditions are present.  
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 Let me turn now to a closer look at the notion of invariance. One very natural 
construal is modal or counterfactual: 
 
(4.1) generalization G is invariant if it would continue to hold were certain 
changes in initial conditions to hold.    
 
(This is not the only possible construal.  Section 6  will briefly consider a   
interpretation in terms of  informational independence.) An obvious question is then how 
(4.1) should be understood. If we   think in terms of the standard Lewisian possible 
worlds analysis, we seem led to construals  like the following:  
 
(4. 2) In the closest possible worlds in which alternative initial conditions Vi 
occur,  G continues to hold 
 
 We then encounter the problem that the Lewsian similarity measure for closeness 
among possible worlds makes reference to the laws of nature,  which include G.  We thus 
seem to have a vicious circle:  to evaluate (4.2)  it looks as though we need to already 
know what the laws of the actual world are (and perhaps whether and to what extent such 
laws   are “preserved” under various counterfactual suppositions).  How then can we use 
a notion of invariance understood in terms of such counterfactuals to get a purchase on 
laws? 
Thoughts along these lines are presumably part of what underlies the complaint 
that appealing to invariance to explicate laws of nature is (viciously) “circular”. For 
example, Psillos  (2004) argues that it is the laws that determine which variations in 
initial conditions are physically possible and hence which variations are appropriate for 
purposes of assessing invariance, an assessment which is also endorsed by Bird, 2007.  
Suppose, to use Psillos’ example, we want to assess the invariance of   generalization G.  
According to Psillos, it would not be appropriate to ask whether G is invariant  under 
some variation that involves a particle moving faster than light since this is a physically 
impossible variation. But (Psillos then argues) this judgment requires that we have 
already identified what the laws are, thus landing us in a “circle”. More generally, many 
philosophers hold that laws are among the “truth-makers” for counterfactuals, so that to 
the extent invariance is bound up with counterfactuals, we can’t appeal to invariance 
considerations to elucidate the notion of law.  
  These complaints move much too quickly from the non-reductive character of an 
invariance-based account to the conclusion that it is epistemically or otherwise circular in 
a vicious way.  First, let me repeat that what invariance requires is stability of a 
generalization under variation in  (independently realizable) initial conditions and not 
under all possible counterfactual suppositions that philosophers may be willing to make.   
Thus for the purposes of assessing invariance we need not worry about   the truth –value 
of such counterfactuals as “if the wires on this table (which are copper) had been 
insulators,   “copper conducts electricity” would not be a “law”. (cf. Lange, 2009, pp 38-
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9).  The antecedents of such counterfactuals do not correspond to assumptions about  
initial conditions, let alone independently realizable ones15. 
  Second, our epistemic access to which initial conditions are physically possible, 
singly or in combination, obviously does not require that we already know what the laws 
of nature are. One can learn about what is physically possible both from observation of 
the variation in states and initial conditions that occur naturally and by active 
experimental manipulation.  For example, one can determine empirically that there is no 
way of realizing initial conditions involving faster than light velocities or insulating 
copper wires. When such variations in conditions are actually realized one can  often 
determine empirically whether some candidate generalization continues to hold under 
such variations. (This is what Boyle did, when he systematically manipulated the pressure 
of air, measured the associated volume and  found a  relatively invariant relationship 
between the two. )  Moreover, to at least some extent inference to what would happen 
under unrealized variations can be justified as a matter of ordinary inductive 
extrapolation (or interpolation):  seeing that the relation F=-kX describing the relation 
between the extension of a particular kind of spring and the force it exerts continues to 
hold for various variations in X,  one infers that it will hold for intermediate  unrealized 
values of X and  perhaps for small increases in X beyond those measured.   
More generally, whether or not laws of nature are among the truth conditions for 
counterfactuals, it is not true that in all cases one must know what those laws are to  
evaluate counterfactuals. If I want to know whether it is true that if I were to drop this 
rock it would fall to the ground, I don’t need to know the laws governing gravitation or 
freely falling bodies. Instead I can just drop the rock, taking care to avoid possible 
confounding factors and observe what happens—the world, rather than elaborate 
inferences involving possible worlds,  gives us the answer. It is bizarre to suppose that I 
cannot assess counterfactual claims in cases like this or do not understand what they 
mean without having prior knowledge of laws of nature or a detailed treatment in terms 
of  Lewisian semantics.  A similar point often holds for the counterfactuals involved in 
assessments of invariance.  
 What about the idea that, nonetheless, laws are required to state  “truth 
conditions” for counterfactuals and that this makes the invariance-based account 
damagingly circular?  This complaint only has force if truth conditions for laws can be 
given in a form that makes no use of counterfactuals16.  That is, the complaint assumes 
that either (i) laws-claims can be reduced to claims that do not presuppose counterfactual 
or other modal notions, as in the BSA or (ii) law clams can be elucidated by appealing to 
special entities like dispositions which are somehow “prior” to counterfactuals. I deny 
both (i) and (ii)—see Sections 7 and 8.      	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15  This is one reason why I would resist attempts to take a very general and 
undifferentiated notion of counterfactual dependence as primitive and then to use this to 
explicate the notion of law, as in Lange 2009. It is only certain kinds of counterfactuals 
that are relevant to assessments of invariance.  
16  Some will think that either laws must be “prior” to counterfactuals (and hence suitable 
for explicating them) or counterfactuals must be “prior” to laws.  I see no reason to 
suppose that one of these alternatives “must” be true, independently of an exhibition of 
the explication in question. Perhaps neither is prior to the other.  
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5. Explanation 
 
I suggested above that an important part of understanding the law/ initial 
condition distinction involves an appreciation of what the distinction is to be used for—
what purpose(s) or function is served by the distinction. There are many interrelated 
candidates for such purposes.  To begin with, if we can identify a generalization that 
holds across a range of variations in initial conditions, we can “export” it to different 
situations within this range and use it to make correct predictions about what will happen 
in those situations.  More generally, satisfaction of the independence conditions of the 
sort described above will often lead to the elimination of redundancy and unnecessary 
complexity, as when we replace a number of different local generalizations each holding 
only in a limited domain with a single overarching generalization which is invariant 
across all those domains17. (Think of informational dependence or at least unexplained 
informational dependence as a kind of redundancy.)  Relatedly, as suggested above, 
making a split between laws and initial conditions allows for the segregation of the 
disorderly part of what we observe in information about initial conditions, allowing for 
the formulation of orderly laws.  
  In addition to this, however, it is also natural to think of the law/initial condition 
distinction as functioning in the service of a certain regulative ideal for explanation and 
causal analysis.  According to this ideal, described in more detail in Woodward, 2003, 
explanation and causal analysis often proceed by providing answers to a range of what-if 
things-had -been different questions--  that is, by  showing how the behavior of  system  
of kind S would change,  under changes in the initial conditions characterizing S, given  
one or more   generalizations applying to S that are invariant under these changes.  In this 
way, we come to see how the behavior of S depends on these initial conditions and how 
these initial conditions “make a difference” for the behavior of S.  The connection with 
my previous discussion should be obvious: realizing this ideal of explanation requires 
that we effect a split between laws and initial conditions, with the former invariant over 
changes in the latter18.    
 Extending this further, one may also think of the independence conditions 
imposed on initial conditions as also having a natural motivation in terms of a related 
ideal of explanation.  Explanations that make use of highly   structured initial conditions   
or correlations among initial conditions or highly unusual initial conditions with no 
further account of where these come from are generally not regarded as fully satisfying— 
for the obvious reason that they seem to raise but leave unanswered the question of where 
that structure comes from (cf. my remarks on the principle of the common cause above).  
By contrast, explanations that appeal to “random” or relatively unstructured initial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 That is, when a generalization holds only in a limited domain, we may think of this as a 
kind of failure of complete independence between the generalization and the initial 
conditions under which it holds.  
18  This suggests the following question for those who advocate replacing law-talk laws 
with something else such as disposition-talk: Can such replacements accomplish the same 
goals as law-talk and its accompanying law/initial condition split?  I’m inclined to think 
not, but this question seems to  go unaddressed in the dispositions literature.  
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conditions do not seem to raise corresponding questions with quite the same urgency—
random, uncorrelated and unstructured initial conditions are a natural stopping place in 
explanations19.  
A common complaint directed against “regularity” accounts of laws, including the 
BSA, is that if laws are mere summaries of what happens, it is hard to see how they can 
figure in explanations. The evaluation of this complaint is a complicated matter, but it is 
worth noting that the invariance-based account is not subject to it. On that account, laws 
do not just record regularities—instead they encode information about 
invariance/independence properties and relations.  These fit naturally into  an account  of 
explanation like that described above that does not take explanation  to consist merely in 
a demonstration that  various explananda “instantiate” regularities.  
 
6. Invariance and Independence Extended 
 
I have advocated a common framework for characterizing both the relationship 
between laws and initial conditions and initial conditions themselves that  appeals to  
notions of  “independence”.  In this section I want to briefly describe several ways in 
which this common element might be extended and developed.  
6. 1) Independence Relations among Variables. Laws often describe 
relationships between the values taken by one variable  (often but not always placed on 
the left hand side of an equation) and several other “independent” variables (placed on 
the right hand side).  Even though the equation may not explicitly say this, it is often 
presumed that these right hand side variables can vary in value independently of each 
other.   For example, in connection the Newtonian inverse square law, F= Gm1  m2/r2,  it 
is usually  assumed  that, as far as this equation taken in itself goes, the distance r 
between the two masses m1 and m2 can change independently of the values taken by those 
masses and similarly the masses can change in magnitude independently of each other.  
In the Lorentz force law, F= qvxB, the charge q of the moving body can vary 
independently of the intensity of the magnetic field, and of its velocity.  This 
independence feature is closely linked to  ideas about the possibility of independent 
variation in initial conditions mentioned in section 2 above. Note also  this is a feature  
that is not captured by the standard (6.1) “all As are Bs” or  (6.2) “all As and Cs are Bs” 
representations of laws (or, for that matter, the claim that laws   represent or are 
“regularities”). In (6.1) there is only one rhs variable and in (6.2), there is no  
representation of  whether A  and C can vary independently. This is another illustration  
of the complex and variegated independence information carried by laws which is missed 
in many philosophical treatments.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19  None of this should be read as an endorsement of what is sometimes called “inference 
to the best explanation”. Instead my picture is this: we look for theories and models that 
exhibit the kind of structure described above because we value explanation as a goal. But 
the fact that such theories/ models would if true provide good explanations is not 
automatically a reason for taking them to be true. For that we require independent 
evidence (independent of judgments of explanatory power) for taking the theories/ 
models to be true.  
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6.2. Independence Relations among Laws. Marc Lange (e.g. 2009), among 
others, has drawn attention to the way in which scientists often reason about laws in ways 
that appear to embody assumptions about the independence of individual laws from one 
another20.   For example, an investigator may ask what the motion of a body would be if it 
were subject to a gravitational force obeying an inverse cube rather than inverse square 
law. Such investigations seem to assume that the laws of motion describing how this 
body responds to forces  (e.g. F=ma) are independent of the specific law describing the 
force itself, so that one can coherently assume a force law different from the actual one,  
while also assuming the laws of motion remain as they actually are, and use these 
together  to calculate the resulting trajectory21. Newton used reasoning of this sort to 
argue that the evidence supported his inverse square law over alternative gravitational 
force laws with different exponents. Again, independence in this context might naturally 
be understood as involving a kind of informational independence, in the sense that 
alternative gravitational force laws are not inconsistent with the laws of motion (that is, 
do not imply alternative laws of motion) .  
6.3. Independence Assumptions in Causal Inference. Although our topic is 
laws rather than causal claims, there are very interesting applications  from the machine 
learning literature  (e.g. Janzing, 2012) illustrating the power of  the 
independence/invariance based ideas described above, particularly in connection with 
determining the direction of causation from statistical information.  These provide 
concrete illustrations of what it might mean for initial conditions to fail to be 
informationally independent of one another and of the “laws/causal generalizations” 
governing a system.  Suppose first that X and Y  are random variables whose values we 
observe. Suppose also (i) Y can be written as a function of X plus an additive error term  
U that is probabilistically independent of X: Y= f(X) + U with X _|_ U (where  _|_ means 
probabilistic independence) . Then it can be shown that if the distribution is non- 
Gaussian, there is no such additive error model from Y to X — that is no model in which 
(ii)  X can be written as X= g(Y)+ V with Y _|_ V.  When applied to empirical data in 
which the correct causal direction is independently known, the assumption that the 
correct causal direction is the one in which the cause is independent of the error leads to 
correct results a majority of the time. One can think of this inference procedure as making 
use of default assumptions about the independence of incoming influences or initial 
conditions of the sort described in section 2. The reliability of the results in this very 
different context illustrates both the power and generality of such assumptions.    
Remarkably even in cases in which there are just two variables—X and Y   —
which are deterministically related via an invertible function (i.e., there is no error term 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20  This is my formulation. Lange may not agree with this way of putting things  
21 If I have understood him correctly, Lange gives this reasoning a very strong modal 
interpretation: he takes it to involve commitment to the idea that (i)  nature is such that if 
the inverse square law had not held, Newton’s laws of motion still would have held. It 
seems to me that a weaker interpretation (advocated above) will often suffice to make 
sense of such reasoning: there is no inconsistency or incoherence in combining the laws 
of motion with an alternative to the inverse square law. This seems to require a kind of 
informational independence between the laws, but perhaps not the idea that there is some 
structure in nature that ensures the truth of the counterfactual (i).  
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U),  it is also possible to determine causal direction by making use of a kind of analog  of 
the  idea that  laws  should be (informationally)  independent of initial conditions 
described as described in Section 2.  Very roughly, the idea is that if the causal direction 
runs as XàY , then we should expect that  the function f describing this relationship to be  
informationally independent of the description of the (marginal) distribution of X (which 
corresponds in this context to an  initial condition)  —independent in the sense that 
knowing this distribution will provide no non-generic information about the functional 
relationship between X and Y and vice-versa. By contrast, it is possible to show that for 
“most” functional relations g when (X—> Y) is the correct direction, writing X as 
function g of Y   (X= g(Y) )will result in a  g that is not informationally independent of 
the distribution of Y.  The relevant notion of independence can be understood in terms of 
algorithmic information theory or in terms of the absence of terms in  f that are finely 
tuned to the distribution of X  and the  presence of corresponding terms tuned to the 
distribution of Y in g .  Again the procedure is relatively reliable as an empirical matter.  
This illustrates how looking for representations in which  lawful  (and causal) 
relationships are independent of or invariant across initial conditions, with independence 
understood as informational independence is a fruitful one, which is at work both in 
contexts in which physical laws are deployed and in the causal inference contexts 
described immediately above.  
 This suggests a further speculation: perhaps an alternative to explicating the 
notion of invariance (and “law” and “cause”) in terms of counterfactuals is to employ 
instead some appropriately behaved notion of informational independence --perhaps at 
bottom these are alternative ways of getting at the same thing. According to this 
conception, one looks for a formulation of laws and initial conditions such that the initial 
conditions are  (informationally) independent of one another, the laws are independent of 
the initial conditions, and the laws are independent of one another. Perhaps such a 
framework, if it could be developed, might be appealing to those who are uncomfortable 
with the use of counterfactuals in explicating the notion of invariance  
 
7. Comparison with Alternatives: BSA   
  
I turn next to a discussion of the relationship between the invariance-based 
account and alternatives, beginning in this section with the BSA. I have criticized this 
account elsewhere (e.g., 2013).  Rather than repeating those criticisms, I want to proceed 
(somewhat) more constructively. From the perspective of the invariance-based account, 
the key question is whether the resources that are employed in the BSA—the information 
in the Humean basis, and the notion of a trade-off between simplicity and strength, can be 
used to (reductively) capture notions like invariance.  To adopt assumptions most 
favorable to the BSA, suppose we had a clear account of the various notions (simplicity, 
strength and a best-trade off between these) that go into the BSA and that in our universe 
there is a single best systemization.  What will be the relationship between the axioms 
and theorems picked out in the BSA framework as “laws” and those claims picked out as 
laws in the invariance-based account?  One possibility is that the two accounts largely 
agree: the axioms/theorems of the BSA turn out to largely coincide with those 
generalizations that are invariant under variations in initial conditions when initial 
conditions meet the independence constraints described above.  This would be a happy 
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outcome; presumably the plausibility of each account would be increased by this sort of 
agreement. Moreover, it would also suggest that the invariance-based account might be 
reinterpreted so as to meet reductivist requirements, assuming that the BSA does.  
The other possible outcome is that the two accounts diverge in their judgments of 
lawfulness, which presumably would mean that the resources of the BSA don’t capture 
invariance- based notions. While I would not claim that this would show the BSA is 
mistaken, I believe it would put some pressure on that account, given that the invariance-
based account appears to substantial roots in scientific practice. If, in the case of 
divergence, BSA advocates claim that it is the invariance based account that is 
misguided,  what would be basis for such a claim?   
Without trying to settle the issue of whether the two accounts agree in their 
assessments of lawfulness, let me note several points. The first is that, conceptually, the 
notion of  a generalization being  an axiom or theorem in a  best balanced systemization 
by no means obviously coincides with notion of a generalization being invariant in the 
manner described above. Prima-facie, it looks as though a generalization might be 
“simple” in some relevant sense (or figure as an axiom in some simple systemization) and 
such that one could derive a lot from it (thus strong in some sense) and yet be relatively 
non-invariant22. Perhaps some cosmological generalizations have this character—
assumptions about the homogeneity or isotropy of the universe on a large scale might be 
part of a simple systemization and might enable one to derive a lot when conjoined with 
other candidate laws but might nonetheless be non-invariant (would have failed to hold if 
initial conditions in the early universe had been different.)  To the extent this is so, the 
BSA will fail to capture invariance-based notions.      
 
8. Comparison: Special Entities    
 
 Although the invariance-based account appears to diverge from the BSA in the 
ways described, it agrees with the BSA in rejecting treatments that appeal to   
metaphysically special “modal” or  “non-Humean” entities (or properties or relations).  
From an invariance-based perspective, what is problematic about such treatments is not 
their invocation of modality per se (after all, invariance is naturally understood as a 
modal notion) but rather their  “reification” or “ontologizing” of modal claims—their 
treatment of modal claims as (or as made true by) existence claims about special entities, 
with such existence claims having some kind of non-trivial explanatory or “grounding” 
role for modal claims.  
   I see such accounts as subject to the following dilemma. Suppose, on the one 
hand, the accounts have no additional physical consequences for what laws are like 
beyond what is suggested by the invariance-based account. In this case, one worries that 
the accounts are mere redescriptions of invariance claims in a metaphysical vocabulary. 
For example, if it is claimed that laws are made true by relations of necessitation between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22  This outcome (simple and strong generalizations failing to coincide with invariant 
ones) seems particularly likely if the relevant notion of simplicity is understood, as it 
often is in discussions of the BSA, purely syntactically—a disjunct is less simple than 
either of its disjuncts etc.  By contrast, whether a generalization is invariant is not 
something that can be identified through its syntax.  
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universals, then, assuming that the invariance account is correct as far as it goes, such 
necessitation relations will need to endow laws with various invariance properties—from  
the truth of N(F,G) in present circumstances it somehow has to follow that, e.g., All Fs 
would continue to be Gs if initial and  background conditions were to be different in 
various ways  and so on. If this connection with invariance exhausts the 
physical/empirical content of what N(F,G) involves, then it looks as though we have a 
mere redescription of these invariance features in the more metaphysical language of 
necessitation. Similarly for the invocation of dispositions as truth-makers: one can build 
it into one’s conception of a disposition that for aspirin to have a disposition to relieve 
headaches,  aspirin must manifest that disposition (under appropriate triggering 
conditions) under a range of different circumstances,  but this sounds very close to   
building invariance-linked requirements into the notion of a disposition.  In this case 
there does not seem enough distance between the two for the attribution of the disposition 
to “explain” the invariance-claim.  
 The other possibility is that the metaphysical entity accounts do have additional 
physical implications that go beyond what is claimed by the invariance account, either by 
excluding possibilities that the invariance-based account permits or by adding further 
physical consequences to that account. Either result seems unwelcome since these 
additional consequences seemed to be reached on non-empirical grounds.  As an 
illustration of the first alternative, many defenders and critics of disposition-based 
accounts   agree that such accounts have difficulties capturing certain kinds of laws or 
features of laws  -- for example, symmetry principles and conservation laws. Apparently 
the problem is that dispositions are most naturally ascribed to objects, and it does not 
seem natural to regard, e.g., the conservation of charge as the manifestation of a 
disposition attributable to any particular object. This leads one leading advocate (Bird, 
2007) to the conclusion that   the disposition-based account results in the judgment that  
symmetry and conservation principles are “pseudo- laws” that may turn out to be 
“eliminated” as “being features of our form of representation rather than features of the 
world requiring to be accommodated within our metaphysics”  (p. 214)  This judgment/ 
prognostication is certainly at odds with the deep significance attributed to such 
principles by most physicists and looks like a clear case in which  restrictions on the 
content of science are being motivated by  appeals to  metaphysical considerations. By 
contrast, an invariance-based account provides a natural and straightforward treatment 
according to which conservation and symmetry principles are regarded as genuine laws.    
 
9. Conclusion.  
 
The upshot of my discussion so far may seem unsettling. I have rejected both 
reductivist accounts of laws and accounts that appeal to both special metaphysical 
entities. Putting aside accepting laws as “primitive”23, the conventional wisdom is that 
these accounts exhaust the possible alternative positions.  In this concluding section I 
want to briefly sketch another possibility.  This will also constitute a further response to 
the complaint the invariance-based account fails to provide “metaphysical 
underpinnings”.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 As in Maudlin 2007. I regret that I do not have space to discuss this alternative.  
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Consider, as an analogy, claims about chances when attributed to macroscopic 
gambling devices, such as roulette wheels, which we can treat as accurately described by 
deterministic laws, as in   
 
(9.1) The chance of red on the next spin is 0.5.   
 
Although such devices are accurately described by deterministic laws, they 
generate stable relative frequencies of outcomes.  These are frequencies that the croupier 
cannot alter by manipulations that are accessible to her. Moreover, those who have access 
only to macroscopic information cannot do any better in prediction than by making use of  
information about such frequencies.   
A considerable physical/mathematical literature, going back to (at least) Poincare 
on “the method of arbitrary functions” explains these features. Very roughly, one can 
show that  
  
(9.2) For a range of different possible dynamics and a   large range of   possible  
distributions of initial conditions meeting  very generic constraints including the presence 
of certain symmetries  (constraints that a macroscopic croupier will be unable to violate) , 
stable frequencies  for device outcomes  result.  
 
In effect one shows that such frequencies are invariant under manipulations that 
the croupier is able to perform and under many other changes in the state of the wheel or 
even its dynamics—in this sense explaining or elucidating why we see stable frequencies.   
We can thus think of (8.2) as describing those features “in the world” that “support” the 
ascription of chances to the systems in question and, in some perfectly good sense, 
“explain”  its chancey behavior.  Note, however, this does not require that there be some 
discrete, isolable entity or property with a mysterious ontological status corresponding to  
“chance”  that  provides the “metaphysical underpinnings”  for the  chancey behavior of 
such systems. The explanation for such behavior instead just involves the diffuse, 
distributed physical considerations described above.  Moreover, if we want to understand 
the behavior of such systems it would not be fruitful to attempt to provide a “reduction” 
of chance to something else – e.g.,  relative frequencies (or some measure of “fit” to 
relative frequencies) plus additional factors like “simplicity” Such a reduction, even if it 
could be provided, would tell us nothing about why such systems  exhibit  the behavior 
they do. Again, the explanation for this behavior lies in facts about the relative 
insensitivity of the behavior of the systems in question to the details of the laws 
characterizing their dynamical behavior and details of the particular initial conditions 
induced by the croupier on successive spins. Neither reductivist treatments of chance nor 
the introduction of chance into our fundamental ontology gives us any insight into such 
facts. Note that the problem with  the latter approach is not  that it is false that the device 
exhibits chance- behavior; it is rather that  ontologizing “chance” wrongly suggests that 
there is a special kind of discrete thing or property that (metaphysically) explains this 
chance- behavior, when the actual explanation has to do with the diffuse considerations 
described above.  
Finally, note that if one is puzzled about chance and its ascription to gambling 
devices, much more is relevant than besides the physical story provided above.    
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Considerations having to do with chance also play distinctive architectural or design roles 
in our reasoning and decision-making—these are matters studied in statistics and 
decision-theory. Understanding chance is a matter of understanding both these 
architectural considerations and the various ways in which chance ascriptions can have 
physical underpinnings/explanations.  
Although the analogy is inexact, I suggest that there are a number of parallels 
with the notion of law.  At least in the case of non-fundamental laws, we don’t have to 
take their invariance properties as brute or primitive. Instead, there is an important 
scientific project of explaining why various relationships we find in nature are invariant 
to the extent that they are. The goal of such explanations is to explain why certain kinds 
of variations in the values of certain variables do not matter for why the  relationships 
hold—why the relationships are stable across variations in those variables.  Similarly to 
the explanations of the behavior of gambling devices, such explanations typically take the 
form of showing that provided systems subject to such laws satisfy certain very generic 
constraints, further variations in other variables will not affect whether they exhibit 
certain stable patterns of behavior. Details vary across cases (and in many cases we do 
not presently know what is responsible for the invariant relationships we see) but 
examples include explanations in terms of statistical mechanics for why variations in 
molecular details that are consistent with certain macroscopic constraints do not matter 
for whether various laws of thermodynamics hold, explanations of various aspects of 
critical point behavior in terms of the renormalization group, and demonstrations in 
particle physics in the form of “decoupling theorems” show that, as long as generic 
constraints are met,  the detailed structure of presently unknown high energy theories is 
irrelevant to laws at lower energy scales.  
Several points about such explanations deserve emphasis. Note first that the 
explananda are not (or not just) generalizations specifying that certain regularities  hold. 
Instead the explananda are facts about the invariance of various relationships. This 
involves a different kind of explanation than a mere derivation showing that some 
generalization is true—instead we are looking for an explanation of the generalization’s 
stability. As with chance, such explanations will appeal to complex and distributed 
considerations and to generic constraints rather than reductions or  special entities and 
properties.  Indeed, it is hard to see how any of the latter could explain facts about 
invariance any more than “chance” is the name of something that explains the behavior of 
roulette wheels. My suggestion is that insofar as explanations of (or underpinnings for) 
invariance in terms of what is in nature are possible, what we should be looking for are 
explanations that have the character described above.   I concede that this strategy does 
not help us to understand the invariance of laws, if any, that are ultimate or fundamental 
in the sense of having no further explanation, but at this point in the development of 
science it is not clear what would provide illumination about this. Note also that, on this 
view,  just as the case with “chance” what is wrong with the  postulation of special 
entities to serve as metaphysical grounds or truth-makers for laws of nature is the 
reification and illusion of explanation this involves. It is not that it is false that aspirin has 
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the power to relieve headaches, rather the point is the ascription of this power to aspirin 
does not explain its behavior24.  
 Finally, let me add that just as in the case of chance, there is more to be said 
about laws than what in nature “underpins” them. An important part of the project of 
understanding the notion of law involves understanding the role this notion plays in our 
reasoning and decision-making,  what sorts of evidence is   appropriate for establishing 
law-claims, how this notion connects to other scientifically important notions and so on. 
These fall into the general category of architectural/design considerations. They connect 
with the methodological role played by laws.  A “metaphysics” of laws will not tell us 
about these matters. I have tried to provide some preliminary suggestions above.  
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